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Abstract
In interpreting the positive relationship between spousal education and one’s earn-
ings, economists have two major hypotheses: cross-productivity between couples and
assortative mating. However, no prior empirical study has been able to separate the
two eﬀects. This paper empirically disentangles the two eﬀects by using twins data
that we collected from urban China. We have two major innovations: we use twins
data to control for the unobserved mating eﬀect in our estimations, and we estimate
both current and wedding-time earnings equations. Arguably, the cross-productivity
eﬀect takes time to be realized and thus is relatively unimportant at the time of the
wedding. Any eﬀect of spousal education on wedding-time earnings should more likely
be the mating eﬀect. We ﬁnd that both cross-productivity and mating are important
in explaining the current earnings. Although the mating eﬀect exists for both husbands
and wives, the cross-productivity eﬀect only runs from Chinese husbands to wives. We
further show that the cross-productivity eﬀect is realized by increasing the hourly wage
rate rather than working hours.
JEL Classiﬁcation: J31, O15, P201 Introduction
Economists have long noticed the positive relationship between spousal education and one’s
earnings (Benham, 1974). Two major hypotheses have been put forward to interpret this
positive correlation. First, the cross-productivity hypothesis, which maintains that spousal
education helps an individual to accumulate human capital and increase earnings: for ex-
ample, couples can share ideas within the family and this is considered productive (see, e.g.,
Benham, 1974; Scully, 1979; Kenny, 1983; Wong, 1986). Second, the observed correlation
may simply be a consequence of assortative mating in the marriage market: that is, those
who marry well-educated people are of high ability (Welch, 1974; Liu and Zhang, 1999).
According to the Becker (1973 and 1974) model, both hypotheses can in theory be correct.
Despite this debate, few empirical studies have explicitly demonstrated the existence of
either cross-productivity or the mating eﬀect. In econometric language, the cross-productivity
eﬀect is the causal eﬀect of spousal education on earnings, but the mating eﬀect is caused
by omitted variables. An ordinary least squares (OLS) estimate of the eﬀect of spousal
education on earnings cannot show the causal eﬀect, because spousal education may have
picked up one’s own ability or the mating eﬀect (Boulier and Rosenzweig, 1984).
We will attempt to empirically distinguish between cross-productivity and the mating
eﬀect by employing unique twins data that we recently collected from urban China. There
are two major innovations in our designs of the tests and data collection. Our ﬁrst innova-
tion is the use of twins data to control for the omitted variable bias, or the mating eﬀect
in our estimations. As monozygotic (from the same egg) twins possess identical genes and
similar family background, their unobservable abilities and family backgrounds are also very
similar. Hence, taking the within-twins diﬀerence would largely remove the bias caused by
the assortative mating eﬀect with respect to one’s unobservable ability or family background.
1However, within-twins estimations may not completely remove all omitted abilities (or the
mating eﬀect), because abilities may not be fully explained by gene and family background.
Our second innovation is to deal with this issue. In our survey, we collected information on
one’s earnings and other variables at the time of marriage and we can estimate a wedding-
time earnings equation. By comparing the estimated eﬀects on current earnings and the
wedding-time earnings, we can distinguish the cross-productivity eﬀect from the mating
eﬀect. Because the cross-productivity eﬀect takes time to be realized, it is relatively unim-
portant at the time of the wedding. Any eﬀect of spousal education on the wedding-time
earnings would more likely be the mating eﬀect.
Our empirical work shows that ordinary least squares estimates do not bias the eﬀect
of spousal education on one’s earnings. The simple OLS estimate using the twins sample
shows that the overall marginal beneﬁt of spousal education on current earnings is 7 percent.
This eﬀect is halved (about 3.5 percent) when we control for one’s own schooling and work
experience. When we apply the within-twins ﬁxed-eﬀect model, the eﬀect is very similar
(3.6 percent), which suggests that there may indeed be a cross-productivity eﬀect and that
the gene or family background does not bias the estimation of the cross-productivity eﬀect.
To further disentangle the cross-productivity eﬀect from the mating eﬀect, we estimate the
wedding-time earnings equation. As the cross-productivity eﬀect is relatively unimportant
at the time of the wedding, this estimate establishes an upper bound for the remaining
mating eﬀect that cannot be controlled for by the within-twins estimations. Our within-
twins estimations show that the upper bound for the remaining mating eﬀect is zero, which
means that the whole mating eﬀect can be well controlled for by the within-twins estimations.
Because within-twins estimations can fully control for the mating eﬀect, the signiﬁcant eﬀect
of spousal education on current earnings must be the cross-productivity eﬀect, which is 3.6
2percent per year of spousal schooling in our sample.
The fact that the gender diﬀerence often appears within marriage motivates us to
estimate the earnings equations by gender. There is indeed a gender diﬀerence in terms of the
return to spousal education. For males, we ﬁnd that the positive eﬀect of the wife’s education
on both current earnings and wedding-time earnings disappears when we use within-twins
estimations, which suggests that the eﬀect of the wife’s education on the husband’s earnings
is purely a result of mating (or gene or omitted family background). In contrast, although
the husband’s education has no eﬀect on his wife’s wedding-time earnings, it has a positive
eﬀect on his wife’s current earnings (3.8 percent) even after we remove the bias caused by
unobservable ability or family background. These ﬁndings suggest that there is a cross-
productivity eﬀect running from Chinese husbands to wives.
Spousal education may increase earnings by either changing the work hours or by
raising the hourly wage. To diﬀerentiate between the two mechanisms, we perform the same
analysis using the current working hours and the hourly wage rate as dependent variables.
The hourly wage rate is calculated by dividing the monthly earnings by total hours worked
in a month. The results using hourly wage rate are similar to those using monthly earnings.
Mating is important for both sexes, but only the husband’s education has a cross-productivity
eﬀect on the wife’s hourly wage rate. We also ﬁnd that the wife’s education tends to increase
the husband’s working time.
Our ﬁnding that spousal education has a cross-productivity eﬀect can shed light on
our understanding of the theories of human capital, marriage and family. Recently, there
have been advances in the empirical literature of human capital, which uses novel methods
to control for unobservables and to measure the causal eﬀect of human capital on earnings
and on its intergenerational transfer. However, this literature has been focused on either
3one’s own human capital (see e.g., Ashenfelter and Krueger (1994) and Ashenfelter and
Rouse (1998)) or parental human capital (see e.g., Behrman and Rosenzweig (1999) and
Plug (2004)). As far as we know, few have attempted to measure the causal eﬀect of spousal
education on earnings. Our ﬁnding suggests that marriage may improve one’s human capital
through learning within-marriage, which is true for Chinese wives. One can accumulate
human capital not only from formal education or from having well-educated parents, but
also from marrying a well-educated spouse.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the methods of estimations
that draw on twins data. Section 3 describes the survey and data. Sections 4, 5, and 6
report the empirical results. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Empirical Strategies
Our empirical work will begin with estimating the log current earnings equation given as
y
c
i = Xiα + βsedui + Ziγ + µi + i, (1)
where the subscript i refers to individual i, and yc
i is the logarithm of current earnings. sedui
is individual i0s spousal education. Xi is the set of observed family variables. Zi is a set of
observed individual variables that aﬀect earnings, which include one’s own education, age,
age squared, gender, and job tenure. µi represents unobservable variables that also aﬀect
earnings: that is, the eﬀect of ability or family background. i is the disturbance term, which
is assumed to be independent of Zi and µi.
The ordinary least squares (OLS) estimate of β in equation (1) might be regarded as
the cross-productivity eﬀect, if we can control for the assortative mating eﬀect by Zi and µi.
Such an estimate of the cross-productivity eﬀect β is generally biased because we normally
cannot perfectly measure µi, which may be correlated to sedui. This bias can also be called
4the assortative mating in education: that is, matching one’s ability or family background
with spousal education so that more able people are both likely to get higher earnings and
tend to marry better educated partners; without controlling µi, β is still a combination of
both the cross-productivity eﬀect and the assortative mating eﬀect where the latter is the
bias to the estimate of the pure cross-productivity eﬀect.
One approach to control for the mating eﬀect is to apply the ﬁxed-eﬀects model to
twins samples. As monozygotic twins are genetically identical and have the same family
backgrounds, they should have the same µi. Taking the within-twins diﬀerence will eliminate
the ability and family eﬀect µi and will separate the unobserved mating eﬀect from the
causal cross-productivity eﬀect. Intuitively, by contrasting the earnings of identical twins
with diﬀerent spousal education, we could ensure that the correlation we observe between
spousal education and one’s earnings is not due to a correlation between spousal education
and one’s gene or family background.
The ﬁxed eﬀects (FE) model can be speciﬁed as follows. The current earnings equations
of a pair of twins are given as,
y
c
1i = Xiα + βsedu1i + Z1iγ + µi + 1i (2)
y
c
2i = Xiα + βsedu2i + Z2iγ + µi + 2i (3)
where yc
ji (j = 1,2) is the logarithm of the current earnings of the ﬁrst and second twins in
the pair. Xi is the set of observed variables that vary by family but not between the twins:
that is, the family background variables. seduji (j = 1,2) is the spousal education for twin
j in family i. Zji (j = 1,2) is a set of variables that vary between the twins.
A within-twins or ﬁxed eﬀects estimator of β for identical twins, βFE, is based on the





2i = β(sedu1i − sedu2i) + (Z1i − Z2i)γ + (1i − 2i) (4)
5The ﬁrst diﬀerence removes both the observable and unobservable family eﬀects: that is, Xi
and µi. As µi has been removed, we can apply the OLS method to Equation (4) without
worrying about bias that is caused by the omitted gene and family background variables.
3 Data
The data that we use are derived from the Chinese Twins Survey (CTS), which was carried
out by the Urban Survey Unit (USU) of the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) in June and
July 2002 in ﬁve cities of China. The survey was funded by the Research Grants Council of
Hong Kong. Based on existing twins questionnaires in the United States and elsewhere, the
survey covered a wide range of socio-economic information. The questionnaire was designed
by the two authors of this paper in close consultation with Mark Rosenzweig and Chinese
experts from the NBS. Adult twins aged between 18 and 65 years were identiﬁed by the
local Statistical Bureaus through various channels, including colleagues, friends, relatives,
newspaper advertisements, neighborhood notices, neighborhood management committees,
and household records from the local public security bureau. Overall, these channels per-
mitted a roughly equal probability of contacting all of the twins in these cities; hence the
twins sample that was obtained is approximately representative. (The within-twins estima-
tion method that is used for this study controls for the ﬁrst-order eﬀects of any unobserved
characteristics that may have led to the selection of twins pairs in the sample). Question-
naires were completed through household face to face personal interviews. The survey was
conducted with considerable care, and several site checks were made by Junsen Zhang and
experts from the National Bureau of Statistics. Following appropriate discussion with Mark
Rosenzweig and other experts, the data input process was closely supervised and monitored
by Junsen Zhang himself in July and August 2002.
6This is the ﬁrst socio-economic twins data set in China, and possibly the ﬁrst in Asia.
The data set includes rich household socio-economic information for respondents in ﬁve cities:
Chengdu, Chongqing, Haerbin, Hefei, and Wuhan. Altogether, there are 4,683 observations,
in which 3,012 observations are from twins households. For the sample of twins, we can
determine whether they are identical (MZ) or non-identical twins. We consider a pair of
twins identical if both twins responded that they have identical hair color, look, and gender.
Of these 3,012 individuals, we have complete information for 435 pairs of married twins (870
individuals), of which 226 pairs are identical twins (552 individuals).
There are a few unique survey designs for this study. First, we collected detailed in-
formation on the twins’ spouses, in particular their years of schooling. Second, we collected
information on current earnings (at the time of the survey, 2002) and the wedding-time
earnings. Third, we collected information on current working hours, which allowed us to
calculate the current hourly wage rate. We also tried to ask retrospective questions on the
wedding-time working hours in our pretest, but found that most of them only remembered
their monthly earnings and not the working hours. Thus, we only asked for the wedding-time
monthly earnings and not for working time in the formal survey. As far as we know, our sur-
vey was the ﬁrst to ask for this additional information, which will help us to disentangle the
mating eﬀect from the cross-productivity eﬀect of spousal earnings. Finally, for comparison,
non-twin households in the ﬁve cities were taken from regular households with whom the
Urban Survey Unit conducts regular monthly surveys. The survey of non-twin households
was conducted at the same time as the twin survey using a similar questionnaire. In total,
we have 1573 non-twin individuals in the sample.
We deﬁne variables according to the literature. The descriptive statistics are reported
in Table 1. In column 1, we report the mean of all variables for identical twins. Fifty-three
7percent of these identical twins were male. On average, they were 40 years old, had 12 years
of schooling, and their spouses also had an average of 12 years of schooling. They had worked
for 20 years, and had monthly earnings of 899 yuan in 2002, where earnings include wage,
bonus and subsidies. They had also worked for 8 years and earned 342 yuan (normalized to
2002 yuan) when they got married. On average, they worked 174 hours a month in 2002,
with an hourly wage rate of 5.6 yuan. The characteristics of the MZ twins sample are very
similar to those of the sample of all twins (column 2) and the whole sample (column 3).
4 Empirical Results
In this section, we report the estimated eﬀect of spousal education by using diﬀerent samples
and methods. We start with OLS regressions using the whole sample including twins and
non-twins. These estimated coeﬃcients are a way to check the representativeness of the MZ
twins sample. We then report both OLS and within-twins ﬁxed-eﬀects estimates using the
MZ twins sample.
In Table 2, we report the results of OLS regressions using the whole sample including
both twins and non-twins. The dependent variable is the logarithm of monthly earnings. The
t-statistics are calculated using robust standard errors allowing clustering at the family-level.
In column 1, we report a regression with spousal education, age, age squared, the
male dummy, and years of marriage as independent variables. The regression shows that
a person can get a 5.1 percent increase in earnings when the spousal education increases
by one year. This eﬀect is precisely estimated with a t-statistic of 4.57. The only other
independent variable that is signiﬁcant is the male dummy, with males having a 27 percent
earnings premium.
In column 2, we add one’s own education and job tenure as independent variables.
8With these two new independent variables, the coeﬃcient on spousal education drops to 2.8
percent, though it remains signiﬁcant. This drop suggests that there is a mating eﬀect, i.e.,
spousal education in column 1 has picked up the positive eﬀect of one’s own human capital
variables. Indeed, one’s own human capital variables, education and tenure, have a positive
and signiﬁcant eﬀect on earnings. Increasing one’s own education by one year increases
earnings by 5.9 percent, while having one more year of tenure raises earnings by 1.5 percent.
Next, we repeat the same OLS regressions using the MZ twins sample. Comparing the
OLS results of the whole sample with those of the MZ twins sample is a way to check the
representativeness of our twins sample. As we only use MZ twins, the sample size is reduced
to 552 (or 276 pairs of twins).
The regression results that are reported in columns 3-4 of Table 2 suggest that our MZ
twins sample is somewhat representative in terms of the estimated coeﬃcients. The eﬀect of
spousal education is about 7 percent with a t-statistic of 9.04 when we do not control one’s
own education and tenure. After controlling for one’s own education and tenure, the eﬀect
of spousal education reduces to 3.5 percent but remains signiﬁcant.
To summarize, the OLS estimates of the eﬀects of spousal education are rather large
even after we control for many covariates, including one’s own education. The remaining
eﬀect is 3.5 percent in column 4 of Table 2, which is precisely estimated with a t-statistic
of 3.87. However, the OLS model cannot identify how much of this estimate is due to the
cross-productivity eﬀect, and how much is due to mating, i.e., the eﬀect of unobserved ability
or family background. Next, we will try to distinguish between the two eﬀects.
In columns 5-6 of Table 2, we report the results of within-twins ﬁxed-eﬀects estimations
of the earnings equation, or the estimations of Equation (4). As MZ twins have the same
age and gender, these two variables are dropped when taking the within-twins diﬀerence.
9The within-twins estimates of the eﬀect of the spousal education are very similar to
the OLS estimates. Comparing column 6 to column 4, the coeﬃcient for spousal education
barely changes, though that for one’s own education decreases dramatically in the within-
twins estimate. These results imply that the mating eﬀect has been well controlled for in
the OLS speciﬁcation in column 4, and the remaining positive eﬀect of spousal education is
very likely to be the true cross-productivity eﬀect.
One interesting ﬁnding is that the eﬀect of spousal education is greater than that of
one’s own education in the within-twins estimate in column 6 of Table 2, though the eﬀect of
spousal education is smaller in the OLS estimate (column 4). This happens because one’s own
education is more associated with one’s own unobserved ability or family background than
spousal education, and therefore becomes less important once we control for the unobserved
gene and family background variables.
5 Potential Biases of Within-twins Estimates and So-
lutions
5.1 Potential Biases
Bound and Solon (1999) examined the implications of the endogenous determination of
which twin receives more formal education, and concluded that twins-based estimation is
vulnerable to the same sort of bias that aﬀects conventional cross-sectional estimation. The
resultant major concern of the within-twins estimate is whether it is less biased than the
OLS estimate, and therefore a better estimate (Bound and Solon, 1999; Neumark, 1999).
From this work we can argue that although the within-twins diﬀerencing removes genetic
variation, i.e., it removes µi from Equation (4), this diﬀerence may still reﬂect an ability bias
because ability is more than just genes. In other words, within-twins estimation may not
completely eliminate the bias of conventional cross-sectional estimation, because the within-
10twins diﬀerence in ability may remain in 1i − 2i in Equation (4), which may be correlated
with sedu1i − sedu2i. If endogenous variation in spousal education comprises as large a
proportion of the remaining within-twins variation as it does of the cross-sectional variation,
then within-twins estimation is subject to as large an endogeneity bias as cross-sectional
estimation.
Although within-twins estimation cannot completely eliminate the bias of the OLS
estimator, it can tighten the upper bound on the return to spousal education. Ashenfelter
and Rouse (1998), Bound and Solon (1999), and Neumark (1999) debated the bias with OLS
and within-twins estimation at length. Note that the bias in the OLS estimator depends on
the fraction of variance in spousal education that is accounted for by variance in unobserved
ability that may also aﬀect earnings: that is,
cov(sedui,µi+i)
var(sedui) . Similarly, the bias of the ﬁxed
eﬀects estimator depends on the fraction of within-twins variance in spousal education that
is accounted for by within-twins variance in unobserved ability that also aﬀects earnings,
that is,
cov(∆sedui,∆µi+∆i)
var(∆sedui) . If we are conﬁdent that spousal education and the earnings error
term are positively correlated both in the cross-sectional and within-twins regressions, and if
the endogenous variation within a family is smaller than the endogenous variation between
families, then the ﬁxed eﬀects estimator is less biased than the OLS estimator. Hence, even
if there is an ability bias in the within-twins regressions, the ﬁxed eﬀects estimator can still
be regarded as an upper bound on the return to spousal education (if spousal education and
ability are positively correlated); in which case, we can credit the within-twins estimates
with having tightened the upper bound on the return to spousal education.
To examine whether the within-twins estimate is less biased than the OLS estimate,
we follow Ashenfelter and Rouse (1998) and conduct a correlation analysis. We use the
correlations of average family spousal education over each twin pair with the average family
11characteristics that may be correlated with ability (for example, own education, membership
of the Chinese Communist Party, working in a foreign ﬁrm, and job tenure) to indicate the
expected ability bias in a cross-sectional OLS regression. We then use the correlations of
the within-twins diﬀerences in spousal education with the within-twins diﬀerences in these
characteristics to indicate the expected ability bias in a within-twins regression. If the
correlations in the cross-sectional case are larger than those in the within-twins case, then
the ability bias in the cross-sectional regressions is likely to be larger than the bias in the
within-twins regressions.
The correlation tests that are reported in Table 3 suggest that the within-twins esti-
mation of the return to spousal education may be less aﬀected by omitted variables than
the OLS estimation. Note that the correlation between average family spousal education
and average education is as large as 0.54 (column 1, row 1), which suggests that twins in
families with a high average level of education marry highly educated people. However, the
correlation of the within-twins diﬀerence in spousal education and the within-twins diﬀerence
in education is only 0.15. This suggests that, using education as a measure of ability, the
within-twins diﬀerence in spousal education is less aﬀected by ability bias than the average
family spousal education. However, this within-twins correlation is still statistically signiﬁ-
cant and large in magnitude, which suggests that within-twins diﬀerencing cannot completely
eliminate the ability bias or the mating eﬀect that is embodied in spousal education. Thus,
the within-twins estimation may only establish an upper bound for the estimated return
to spousal education. The evidence is suggestive even though these characteristics are an
incomplete set of ability measures.
125.2 Remaining Mating Eﬀect in Within-twins Estimates
The last subsection shows that we are concerned that the within-twins estimations may
not completely remove all the mating eﬀects, and that the estimated coeﬃcient on spousal
education on current earnings may still consist of both the cross-productivity eﬀect and the
remaining mating eﬀect. Generally, it is very diﬃcult to completely disentangle the two
eﬀects empirically.
Another innovation of our paper is to establish an upper bound for the omitted mating
eﬀect by estimating the wedding-time earnings equation. As couples have fewer opportu-
nities to help each other accumulate their human capitals before the wedding, the cross-
productivity eﬀect should be relatively unimportant at this time. The within-twins estimate
of the eﬀect of spousal education on the wedding-time earnings can therefore establish an
upper bound for the omitted mating eﬀect in such a model. The speciﬁc wedding-time












m + µi + υ2i (6)
where ym
ji (j = 1, 2) is the logarithm of the wedding-time earnings of the ﬁrst and second
twin in the pair. A within-twins estimator for identical twins is based on the ﬁrst diﬀerence






m(sedu1i − sedu2i) + (Z1i − Z2i)γ
m + (υ1i − υ2i) (7)
The within-twins estimate of βm will consist of both the cross-productivity and the remaining
mating eﬀect, if mating is individual-speciﬁc (rather than family speciﬁc). However, as
cross-productivity is relatively unimportant at the time of the wedding, the estimated βm
establishes an upper bound for the remaining mating eﬀect that is not controlled for by the
13within-twins estimations. If our within-twins model can fully control for the mating eﬀect,
then the estimated βm should be close to zero.
The estimation results of the wedding-time earnings equation suggest that our econo-
metric speciﬁcation can control for the whole mating eﬀect. In Table 4, we report the
estimates of the wedding-time earnings equation. Note that spousal education has a large
and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient in OLS regressions in column 1 of Table 4; however, it becomes
much smaller and insigniﬁcant once we also include one’s own education and tenure as co-
variates in column 2. Similar to the OLS estimate, the within-twins estimate in column 4 is
also smaller in magnitude and insigniﬁcant. The fact that spousal education has no eﬀect
on the wedding-time earnings suggests that the whole mating eﬀect can be well controlled
for by either observable human capital variables or by taking the within-twins diﬀerence.
The results for the current and wedding-time earnings equations can be used to infer
whether there is a cross-productivity eﬀect. The estimate of the wedding-time earnings
equation suggests that the mating eﬀect can be well controlled for by our within-twins
model. If we assume that the mating eﬀect of spousal education in the current earnings
equation can be fully controlled for, just as it can be in the wedding-time earnings equation,
then the signiﬁcant coeﬃcient for spousal education in the current earnings equation means
that there is a positive cross-productivity eﬀect. As has been shown by column 6 of Table 2,
the cross-productivity eﬀect of spousal education is 3.6 percent per year of spousal schooling.
6 Further Analysis
6.1 Diﬀerence between Sexes
Our analysis pooled males and females together. However, there are reasons to believe
that the role of cross-productivity is diﬀerent for husbands and wives within a family. The
two sexes may have diﬀerent learning abilities and more importantly, one may be more
14dominant.1 For example, if the husband dominates in a family and makes job and other
activity related decisions for the wife, then one would expect the husband’s education to be
important in determining the wife’s earnings, but the wife’s education to be unimportant in
determining the husband’s earnings.
In fact, China provides an interesting social setting where one might expect that males
dominate in families. Although in the West patriarchalism has become antiquated, Chinese
families remained patriarchal until quite recently (Ch’u, 1961; Hamilton, 1990) when the
father was still the head of the family and had authority over all of its members. His control
of the family economy and his power to make decisions on resource allocation strengthened
that authority. The concept of ancestor worship, central to the solidarity of the family and
to its perpetuation, further enhanced the authority of the family head, who was also the
family priest. In recent years, however, women have been gaining greater decision-making
power in daily family aﬀairs. According to a national survey on family life conducted by
the All-China Women’s Federation (China Daily, September 10, 2002), 57 percent of wives
have more say than their husbands in decisions on minor, daily spending, whereas only 13.9
percent of husbands assume the role of decision-maker in similar matters.2 However, when
it comes to major family decision-making, husbands still have the upper hand, with 24.5
percent having the ﬁnal say; whereas only 7 percent of wives make similar decisions. These
survey results indicate that although the women’s position in the family has improved, men
still dominate in Chinese families.
The results of regressions using the male and female twins sample separately show a
diﬀerence between sexes. In the left panel of Table 5, we report the results of within-twins
ﬁxed-eﬀects estimations of the spousal education on male’s current and wedding-time earn-
1In a sense, when one sex dominates, it is like the family in Becker’s unitary model (Becker, 1991).
2The remaining spouses make such decisions jointly.
15ings, or the estimations of Equations (4) and (7) for males. For males, our within-twins
estimates show that the wife’s education has no eﬀect on either his current or wedding-time
earnings (columns 1-4), which suggests that no cross-productivity eﬀect from wives to hus-
bands can be identiﬁable for Chinese families. The within-twins pair results for the female
twins sample are quite diﬀerent (columns 5-8). Although the husband’s education has a sig-
niﬁcant positive eﬀect on his wife’s current earnings, it has zero eﬀect on his wife’s wedding-
time earnings. These results together suggest that there is indeed a cross-productivity eﬀect
from Chinese husbands to their wives.
6.2 Longer Hours or Better Paid?
In the above analysis, we use monthly earnings as our dependent variable. Spousal educa-
tion may have an eﬀect on monthly earnings through either hourly wage rate or monthly
working hours. To diﬀerentiate between the two channels, we examine the eﬀects of spousal
education on one’s current hourly wage and working hours. As the eﬀect for the male and
female samples are diﬀerent, we conduct the analysis for male and female MZ twins samples
separately.
The regression results again show that the wife’s education has no eﬀect on the hourly
wage rate of her husband, while the husband’s education has a positive eﬀect on the hourly
wage rate of his wife. In column 1 of Table 6, the OLS estimations show that spousal
education has a signiﬁcant eﬀect on his hourly wage. However, the eﬀect becomes zero after
we control for his ability or family background by the within-twins estimations in column 2.
These empirical results suggest that, consistent with those in Table 5, the wife’s education
has no cross-productivity eﬀect on the husband’s hourly wage. In contrast, the husband’s
education has a cross-productivity eﬀect on the hourly wage rate of his wife, as shown by
the within-twins estimate in column 6.
16It is also interesting to see how one’s own and spousal education aﬀect working hours.
Column 3 shows that the husband’s own education has a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect on his
current working hours, while the wife’s education has a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect on his
working hours. After we employ within-twins model in column 4, the eﬀect of the husband’s
own education becomes zero. Because a man’s own education is positively correlated to his
ability, the change of the eﬀects demonstrates that more able men spend less time working
and a man’s education has no eﬀect on his own working hours. Interestingly, the within-twins
estimate of the eﬀect of the spousal education on a man’s working hours more than doubles
that of OLS estimate, which suggests that the wife’s education has a positive eﬀect on the
husband’s working hours. One potential explanation is that women with higher education
can take better care of the family and the husband can spend more time working. Columns
7 and 8 show that both a woman’s own education and spousal education have no eﬀects on
her working hours.
To summarize, we obtain similar results when we use the hourly wage rate as the
dependent variable: the mating eﬀect is important for both males and females, but the
cross-productivity eﬀect in terms of wage only exists from husbands to wives. There is
additional evidence that men with better-educated wives tend to work longer.
7 Conclusion
We empirically distinguish between the cross-productivity and mating eﬀect by employing
unique twins data we recently collected from urban China. By using the within-twins model
to control for the omitted variable bias, we can largely remove the bias caused by the
assortative mating eﬀect with respect to one’s unobservable ability or family background.
By comparing the estimated eﬀects on current earnings and the wedding-time earnings, we
17can establish an upper bound for the omitted mating eﬀect.
We ﬁnd that our within-twins model can well control for the mating eﬀect, and any
eﬀect of spousal education on current earnings is the cross-productivity eﬀect. The cross-
productivity eﬀect in our sample is 3.6 percent. Our further analysis shows that the cross-
productivity eﬀect only happens from husbands to wives but not vise versa, which reﬂects
male-dominance in Chinese society. Finally, by estimating both the hourly wage and monthly
working hours equations, we ﬁnd that the cross-productivity eﬀect of husbands on wives is
through increasing the hourly wage of wives.
The ﬁnding that spousal education has a cross-productivity eﬀect could shed light on
our understanding of the theories of human capital, marriage, and the family. Previous em-
pirical works have shown that people can acquire earnings-enhancing human capital through
formal schooling and intergenerational transfer, but have generally paid less attention to
the further improvement of human capital after the formal education. In this paper, we
ﬁnd at least one potential channel of the post-school improvement of human capital, that
is, learning within marriage. This has two implications. First, a rise in education not only
improves one’s own earnings and household production, but also raises the earnings of the
spouse. If we only considered the eﬀect on own earnings, we would have missed an impor-
tant part of the total eﬀect of one’s education on family earnings. Second, it seems that
learning beyond normal schooling ages may have good payoﬀs both within and outside fam-
ilies. This implication becomes even more important in the light of the continuing rise of
life expectancy.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of the Twins and Non-Twins Samples 
          
MZ Twins  All Twins 
Whole 





  ( 3 )  
       
Gender (male=1, female=0)  0.53    0.52    0.51 
  (0.50)  (0.50)  (0.50) 
       
Age  39.95  38.83  40.79 
  (7.82)  (7.72)  (8.25) 
       
Own education (years of schooling)  11.88    11.78    11.65 
  (3.08)  (3.05)  (3.02) 
       
Tenure  (number  of  years  20.24  19.13  20.65 
working full time since age 16)  (8.51)    (8.29)    (8.76) 
          
Current  earnings  (monthly  wage,    898.70  892.21  872.76 
bonus and subsidy in 2002 yuan)  (520.60)    (568.27)    (593.16) 
       
Current hourly wage rate  5.63    5.64    5.58 
  (3.73)  (3.87)  (4.66) 
       
Current  monthly  work  hours  173.62  175.49  173.01 
  (39.79)  (44.25)  (43.10) 
       
Wedding-time tenure  7.51    7.40    7.51 
  (4.69)  (4.46)  (4.49) 
       
Wedding-time  earnings  (monthly  wage,    342.48  355.02  289.90 
bonus and subsidy in 2002 yuan)  (342.28)    (339.07)    (428.01) 
           
Spousal  education  (years  of  schooling)  11.55  11.62  11.46 
  (3.11)  (3.09)  (3.28) 
       
Sample  size  552  870  2443 
  
Table 2: OLS and Within-Twin-Pair Estimates of the Effect of Spousal Education on Current Earnings 
Dependent Variable  log(current earnings) 
Sample  Whole Sample    MZ Twins Sample    MZ Twins Sample 
Model OLS    OLS    Within-twin-pair 
 (1)  (2)    (3)  (4)    (5)  (6) 
Spousal education  0.051***  0.028***    0.070*** 0.035***    0.039*** 0.036*** 
 (4.57)  (3.45)    (9.04)  (3.87)  (3.39)  (3.06) 
                
Own human capital attributes            
Education   0.059***      0.068***      0.024 
   (11.88)      (8.60)      (1.35) 
                
Age -0.007  -0.016    0.048*  0.042       
 (0.51)  (1.19)    (1.75)  (1.43)       
                
Age
2/100 0.015  0.009    -0.045  -0.045       
 (0.93)  (0.59)    (1.34)  (1.34)       
                
Male 0.269***  0.259***    0.308***  0.293***       
 (9.66)  (10.37)    (6.22)  (6.34)       
                
Job tenure    0.015***      0.007      0.008 
   (4.74)      (0.97)      (0.66) 
                
Years of marriage  -0.002  0.000    -0.006  -0.003    -0.008  -0.007 
 (0.47)  (0.00)    (0.92)  (0.43)  (0.93)  (0.74) 
                
Constant 5.985***  5.701***    4.702***  4.380***    6.309***  5.881*** 
 (18.80)  (20.42)    (8.38)  (7.43)   (35.24)  (15.73) 
                
Observations 2462  2455    552  552    552  552 
Twin pairs              276  276 
R-squared 0.12  0.20    0.18  0.27    0.04  0.05 
Robust t statistics in parentheses; OLS regressions allow clustering at the family level; All regressions include city 








        
Own education  0.5387***    ΔOwn education  0.1535*** 
  (<0.01)     (<0.01) 
        
Own job tenure  -0.1722***    ΔOwn job tenure  0.0790*** 
 (<0.01)      (0.06) 
        
Party membership  0.1470***    ΔParty membership  -0.0015 
 (<0.01)      (<0.97) 
        
Working in foreign firm  0.0868**    ΔWorking in foreign firm  0.1500*** 
 (0.05)      (<0.01) 
        
Note: The significance levels are in parentheses. *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; 
***significant at 1%. The between-family correlations are the correlations between average family 
spousal education (average of the twins) and average family characteristics, and the within-twin-pair 
correlations are the correlations between the within-twin-pair differences in spousal education and the 




Table 4: OLS and Within-Twin-Pair Estimates of the Effect of Spousal Education on the 
Wedding-time Earnings Using MZ Twins Sample 
Dependent Variable  log(wedding-time earnings) 
Model OLS    Fixed-Effect 
 (1)  (2)    (3)  (4) 
Spousal education  0.053***  0.005    0.027  0.027 
 (3.75)  (0.39)    (1.47)  (1.42) 
          
Own human capital attributes        
Education   0.057***      0.011 
   (3.83)      (0.38) 
          
Male 0.103  0.135*       
 (1.35)  (1.88)       
          
Job tenure    -0.039***    0.103***  -0.010 
   (6.23)    (7.42)  (0.53) 
          
Years of marriage           
          
          
Constant 4.889***  5.449***    5.133***  5.218*** 
 (22.62)  (18.16)    (23.99)  (9.27) 
          
Observations 552  552    552  552 
Twin pairs        276  276 
R-squared 0.06  0.20    0.01  0.01 
Robust t statistics in parentheses;    OLS regressions allow clustering at the family level; All 
regressions include city dummies; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   Table 5: Within-Twin-Pair Estimates of the Effect of Spousal Education on Current and Wedding-time Earnings for Male and Female Twins 
Sample  Male MZ Twins    Female MZ Twins 
Dependent Variable 
log(current earnings)   
log(wedding-time 
earnings) 
 log(current  earnings)   
log(wedding-time 
earnings) 
 (1)  (2)    (3)  (4)   (5)  (6)   (7)  (8) 
Spousal education  0.027  0.025    0.039  0.046   0.046***  0.038**    0.019  0.016 
 (1.41)  (1.29)    (1.08)  (1.25)   (3.18)  (2.55)   (1.23)  (1.03) 
Own human capital attributes               
Education   0.008      -0.048      0.042*      0.082*** 
   (0.34)     (1.05)     (1.68)     (3.17) 
                    
Job tenure    -0.012      0      0.027      -0.021 
   (0.70)     (0.00)     (1.56)     (1.15) 
                    
Years of marriage  -0.015  -0.014          -0.002  -0.001       
  (1.22) (1.13)          (0.13) (0.06)       
                    
Constant  6.663*** 6.837***   5.022*** 5.502***  5.995*** 5.052***   5.210*** 4.632*** 
 (23.71)  (11.83)    (12.92)  (5.44)   (25.66)  (10.23)   (26.69)  (9.39) 
                    
Observations  294  294   294  294  258  258   258  258 
Twin  pairs  147  147   147  147  129  129   129  129 
R-squared 0.03  0.03    0.01  0.02  0.07  0.11   0.01  0.10 
Robust t statistics in parentheses; All regressions control city dummy variables; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 
1%. Table 6: OLS and Within-Twin-Pair Estimates of the Effect of Spousal Education on Current Hourly Wage Rate and Monthly Work Hours for Male and Female Twins 











 OLS  
Within- 
twin pair 
 (1)    (2)    (3)    (4)   (5)  (6)    (7)    (8) 
Spousal education  0.045***    -0.007    1.844*    3.990**    0.015  0.032*    -1.099    -1.725 
  (4.04)    (0.34)   (1.67)  (2.16)   (0.86)  (1.88)   (1.11)  (1.15) 
      
Own human capital attributes                    
Education 0.060***    0.016    -2.417**    -0.399    0.082***  0.025    0.061    1.541 
  (5.66)    (0.62)   (2.17)  (0.17)  (5.73)  (0.87)    (0.07)    (0.62) 
                      
Age  -0.064      -2.346        0.129**      -1.473     
  (1.54)      (0.70)        (2.24)      (0.56)     
                      
Age
2/100  0.064      6.098        -0.153**      2.531     
  (1.37)      (1.55)        (2.23)      (0.82)     
                      
Job  Tenure  0.016  0.012  -2.351*   -1.168   0.016  0.021   -1.433*   1.433 
  (1.55)    (0.57)   (1.94)  (0.59)  (1.48)  (1.08)    (1.94)    (0.84) 
      
Years of Marriage  0.007    0.011    -0.587    -0.644    -0.010  -0.004    0.896    0.627 
  (0.68)    (0.80)   (0.75)  (0.54)  (1.10)  (0.27)    (1.23)    (0.50) 
                      
Constant 1.734**    1.142    219.569***    168.853***   -2.426**  0.420   211.612***  139.450*** 
  (2.00)    (1.65)   (3.28)  (2.72)  (2.13)  (0.76)    (3.96)    (2.89) 
      
Observations  270    270   270  270   230  230   230  230 
Twin  pairs      135      135      115     115 
R-squared 0.29    0.01    0.07    0.04   0.22  0.06   0.05  0.02 
Robust t statistics in parentheses; OLS regressions allow clustering at the family level; All regressions include city dummies; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 
5%; *** significant at 1% 
 